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 Abstract 
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate and analyze the contradiction between the model of 
time preference and the concept of savoring and thereupon outline product categories that 
particularly apply to each one of the preceding models. Both concepts are discussed and 
exemplified in order to depict the contradiction. Subsequently, the terms utilitarian and hedonic 
goods are introduced in order to outline useful patterns for the correct assignment of goods to 
each model. The definition of utilitarian goods is applied to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs to 
show that they do particularly react to the model of time preference. Afterwards, existing 
knowledge about the concept of savoring is used in order to show the correlation between 
hedonic goods and the concept of savoring. Finally, the paper shows that companies can benefit 
from this categorization by either reacting to given distribution structures in terms of marketing 
or by identifying to which extent a certain product is perceived as utilitarian or hedonic good 
and correspondingly postpone or speed-up delivery.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The time preference model has been dominant and compelling for the past decades of economic 
debate (Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2000, p. 171). It describes the “rate at which the utility of a good 
dissipates solely from delaying consumption, or impatience” (Atmadja, Sills, Pattanayak, Yang, 
& Patil, 2017, p. 231).  
 
George Loewenstein (1987), however, was one of the first to point out exceptions from this 
theory in his article “Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption” and even 
defended the concept of negative time preference or savoring by naming an intuitive example:  
 
This pattern is often observed among children at Hallowe'en when some trick-or-
treaters collect then hoard their candy rather than consuming it. Apparently the 
pleasure derived from savouring future consumption of the candy in some cases 
outweighs what can be obtained from immediate consumption. (p. 678) 
Unlike the model of time preference, the concept of savoring displays the increased customer 
benefit through anticipation of an imminent good (Bryant, 1989, p. 175). In other words, it 
describes the positive effect customers can already derive from looking forward to something. 
Consequently, the two concepts confront each other as they link active waiting to contradicting 
emotions of the consumer.  
 
By means of a meta-analysis, this paper aims to outline explanatory patterns to face the 
contradiction that emerges from Loewenstein’s insight. To achieve this, in the first two chapters 
the models of each time preference and savoring will be looked at closely to show what exactly 
the contradictory issues are. Thereupon, the focus will be on product categories that react to 
each one of the preceding models in particular. In order to outline them, the terms “hedonic” 
and “utilitarian” goods (Dhar & Wertenbroch, 2000) will be introduced, exemplified and serve 
as criteria for the assignment of products into the categories. 
  
Eventually, the paper will discuss the relevance of those product categories for business and 
analyze to which extent the specific findings from single product categories display patterns 
that can be generalized.  
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2 The concept of time preference 
 
Individuals constantly make decisions about their consumption behavior. Those decisions 
“involve whether they take gains (…) now or at some later time(s).” (Doyle, 2012, p. 116). The 
basic concept of time preference implies that individuals prefer the consumption of goods now 
over future consumption. In the strict sense, it can be described as the “exchange ratio between 
future and current welfare.” (Hermann & Musshoff, 2016, p. 16) 
In Fishburn and Rubinstein’s (1982) basic presentation of the concept, the simple question is 
asked whether the reader would prefer $1000 today, or $2000 in one year (p. 677). What seems 
rather trivial at first sight is actually of more importance than one might suggest. For some, the 
answer to the question would obviously be “in one year”. In this case, the additional amount of 
$1000 would seem to supersede the burden of waiting for one year. However, one could go on 
and ask if the answer would still be the same if, instead of $2000, only $1500 will be paid off 
in one year. Perhaps, at this point there might already be a considerable share of individuals 
that would prefer the smaller amount now instead of receiving $500 more in one year. Those 
individuals have, according to the model, a higher time preference in comparison to those who 
would still wait one year to receive the full amount of $1500. As a matter of fact, the amount 
of money that is, in this example, needed to compensate for the one year delay is very 
individual. The amount will, however, most probably not fall below $0, or in other words: Most 
people will not prefer less money in one year than more money now. This is why some sources 
use the extended term positive time preference. 
This concept emerged at the beginning of the 20th century and was, for a certain period of time, 
still a rather general and vague idea that included a variety of possible motives (Frederick, 
Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002, p. 355). Nonetheless, the concept quickly developed into 
a dominant and widely used model in the research field of intertemporal choice. Especially in 
“theories of savings and investment, economic growth, interest rate determination and asset 
pricing” (Becker & Mulligan, 1997, p. 729) time preference is of substantial importance.  
With the increasing use of the generic concept, many terms came into existence that were used 
as synonyms such as time discounting, temporal discounting or even delay discounting, while 
the term time preference itself remains widely used in economics (Doyle, 2012, p. 116). 
Sometimes, even the term impatience is used due to its apparent simplicity, although it does not 
encompass exactly the same, as shown later in this paper.  
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In 1937, Paul Samuelson introduced the discounted utility (DU) model that is based on the 
assumptions of time preference and assumes that all motives that may affect intertemporal 
choice can be “condensed into a single parameter – the discount rate” (Frederick et al., 2002, 
p. 351). In fact, along with the model of positive time preference, the validity of the DU model 
is a key assumption in standard economic analysis (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991, p. 347). 
Therefore, when talking about time preference it has become typical also to talk about the 
discount rate (Warner & Pleeter, 2001).  
 
3 The concept of savoring and Loewenstein’s kiss 
 
 “If for example you come at four o’clock in the afternoon, I shall start feeling 
happy at three o’clock. As the time passes, I shall feel happier and happier.” 
—Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, The Little Prince  
 
The above passage from The Little Prince nicely illustrates the core principle of savoring. 
Savoring can be defined as the benefit individuals can derive from the anticipation of future 
gains (Loewenstein, 1987, p. 667; Dixon, Victorino, Kwortnik, & Verma, 2017, p. 948).  
 
Jeremy Bentham (1789) was one of the first to point out the importance of anticipation 
(Baucells & Bellezza, 2016, p. 729). He recognized that, besides the actual consumption of 
goods, anticipation could be a significant source of pleasure. Interestingly, even though the 
concept was first mentioned this early, there has been limited research in this field (Chun, 2009, 
p. 2).  
 
There are many situations in everyday life in which one can potentially savor future events. The 
most frequent example in the research field of intertemporal choice, however, is the anticipation 
of holidays. A study on happiness on vacation revealed that, in fact, vacationers were happier 
before their holidays than afterwards (Nawijn, 2011, p. 559). Consequently, the pleasure that 
individuals derive from the anticipation of their imminent vacation must somewhat supersede 
the benefit the vacation generates once it is over.  
 
One of the most systematic approaches towards savoring comes from Loewenstein (1987). He 
presents a study in which 30 undergraduates were asked how much they were willing to pay in 
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order to obtain different hypothetical amenities at different times. They could choose between 
obtaining the amenity; (1) immediately; (2) in twenty-four hours; (3) in three days; (4) in one 
year; (5) in ten years.  
 
One of the presented scenarios to be considered was to receive a kiss from the undergraduates’ 
favorite movie star. Although the study does not deliver absolute numbers, one can see 
remarkable tendencies. Compared to the undergraduates’ immediate willingness to pay, they 
were willing to pay approximately 55% more to receive the kiss in twenty-four hours. In order 
to receive the kiss in three days, the undergraduates stated that they were willing to pay about 
75% more.  
 
Interestingly, when the time of anticipation exceeded a certain point, the students’ willingness 
to pay started to decrease again. In order to receive the kiss in one year, the students were only 
willing to pay about 25% more. The relative value placed on receiving the kiss in ten years was 
almost minus 50%. Nevertheless, the survey impressively displays the economic capacity of 
the concept of savoring.  
 
4 Contradictory Issues 
 
As shown previously, the concept of time preference implies that consumers’ perceived utility 
u of consumption C at the time t must be bigger than the perceived utility of consumption at a 
later date t+1. The mathematical relation between utility and time can be depicted in form of 
the following assumption:  
 
Atime preference:   uC(t) > uC(t+1) 
 
In Chapter 3 the concept of savoring was defined as the perceived benefit or utility that 
consumers can derive from future consumption. Therefore, the utility of consumption at the 
time t must be smaller than the utility of consumption at a later date t+1, where additional utility 
can be added through the process of savoring. However, as also stated in Chapter 3 there is a 
point in time T at which there is no more additional utility through further postponement of the 
time of consumption. It follows: 
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Asavoring: uC(t) < uC(t+1)    for all     t < (T – 1) 
 
The postponement of consumption, if Atime preference holds true, would necessarily lead to a 
decrease in perceived utility. Yet if Asavoring holds true – until t < (T – 1) – the postponement of 
consumption would lead to an increase in perceived utility. As one can easily conclude, the two 
assumptions contradict each other in many cases, even though the concepts of time preference 
and savoring have been widely used in economics, psychology, marketing and decision analysis 
(Chun, 2009, p. 2). Loewenstein (1987) was among the first to point out this contradiction.  
 
However, one cannot derive direct insights concerning the validity of each model. There are 
three possibilities:  
 
(1) none of the models is correct; 
(2) only one model is correct; 
(3) both models are correct under specific circumstances.  
 
 
Even though (1) and (2) would be the most simple and convenient interpretations, they cannot 
be correct as there are examples of both models in everyday life (see example Chapter 2 and 
the “kiss study” in Chapter 4). It follows that (3) is correct but that both models must be limited 
to some extent. But what is this limitation and when should which model be applied?  
 
Firstly, it could be argued that the correct application of each model is completely individual. 
One individual, for example, might be very impatient leading to a higher personal time 
preference. Or one individual might be especially capable of deriving pleasure from future 
gains leading to a higher personal rate of savoring. This interpretation might seem very 
convincing, and it even might be adequate. Yet it is of little use for businesses, as they cannot 
evaluate each customer’s impatience or capability of savoring.  
 
Another reasonable interpretation would be that each product and each service reacts especially 
to one of the two models. For instance, it could be reasoned that the consumption of a liter milk 
applies to the assumption of time preference much more than to the assumption of savoring. It 
seems somewhat logical that milk has low anticipatory potential. On the other hand, going to 
the cinema might be something that can be anticipated and that can possibly trigger the process 
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of savoring. Although this approach might seem compelling, it is again of limited use for 
businesses, as it does not define which products generally react to which assumption.  
5 Utilitarian and hedonic goods 
 
As shown in Chapter 4, there are different intuitive approaches towards the application of both 
time preference and savoring. However, they fail to provide any patterns that can help to define 
the range and applicability of each model. Therefore, this chapter will analyze to which extent 
the categorization into “utilitarian” and “hedonic” goods can help to better understand certain 
regularities.    
 
When individuals make decisions about their consumption behavior, they include – consciously 
or not – tradeoffs between utilitarian and hedonic goods (Dhar & Wertenbroch, 2000, p. 60). 
As the field of intertemporal choice is particularly analyzing consumption behavior, it might be 
beneficial to analyze what these tradeoffs imply.  
 
Broadly, utilitarian goods encompass all entities of consumption that are “primarily 
instrumental and functional” (Dhar & Wertenbroch, 2000, p. 60) meaning that the consumption 
of these goods satisfies a certain need of the consumer. Common examples are staple foods like 
rice or milk, microwaves and medicine.  
 
On the other hand, hedonic goods can be described as goods whose consumption leads to 
experiential gratification (Okada, 2005). Consumption is typically guided by “emotional wants 
rather than functional needs” (Khan, Dhar, & Wertenbroch, 2005, p. 1). In other words, hedonic 
goods are entities of consumption that are pleasurable and emotive (Batra & Ahtola, 1991, p. 
161).  
  
Sometimes, however, the transition from utilitarian to hedonic is fluent and can even strongly 
depend on each individual (Khan et at., 2005, p. 4). What is a necessity for one individual might 
be pure pleasure for the other. The differentiation becomes even more difficult when goods 
contain both utilitarian as hedonic features. A car, to name a common example, can be both a 
utilitarian good as it allows one to go from A to B, as it can also be a hedonic good if its design 
is especially pleasing. 
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5.1 Connecting the models  
 
As stated above, the consumption of utilitarian goods 
mainly satisfies consumers’ needs. In order to gain an 
overview of the different kinds of needs, it could be 
useful to have a closer look at Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs (Fig. 1). Maslow distinguishes between basic 
needs, containing both physiological and safety needs, 
psychological needs and self-fulfillment needs leaving 
aside all types of consumption that satisfy wants rather than needs. 
There is no doubt that basic needs do not have a high anticipatory potential. On the contrary: It 
seems reasonable to cover the needs for water supply or medication as soon as possible. The 
same pattern applies to psychological needs. It could be argued that needs like love or 
belongingness entail a higher utility through fulfillment than from anticipation. Lastly, even the 
need for self-actualization is unlikely to generate utility through postponement and therefore 
entails a high rate of time preference. 
One can observe that all types of Maslow’s needs entail a high, or at least positive time 
preference. Supposed Maslow’s hierarchy of needs covers all types of needs, it can be 
concluded that the model of time preference applies to any kind of consumption satisfying 
needs and consequently to utilitarian goods. Interestingly, as shown in Chapter 2, money entails 
a positive rate of time preference. Following the conclusion above, money must be perceived 
as a mainly utilitarian item.  
 
On the other hand, Jevons (1905) recognized that anticipal pleasure, and therefore the rate of 
savoring, depends on the extent to which consumers expect to derive pleasure from future 
consumption of a certain good (p. 64). As hedonic goods were described as pleasurable and 
emotive (Batra & Ahtola, 1991, p. 161) they are in most cases able to build this expectation.  
Consequently, the consumption of hedonic goods must react to the assumption of anticipal 
pleasure or savoring and therefore entail a negative time preference.  
 
Fig. 1: Maslow’s hierarchy of needs; source: https://www.simplypsychology.org/maslow.html 
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5.2 Business strategies 
 
There are several insights following these conclusions that can be useful for business. First of 
all, goods produced only after being ordered, like tailored suits or books on demand, require 
several stopovers or preparations in order to reach the customer. If the management recognizes 
this early, they can design their marketing tools in a way that makes the products perceivable 
as hedonic goods so that customers can better savor consumption.  
 
Furthermore, businesses must identify to which extent their products are perceived as hedonic 
or utilitarian goods. By doing that, they can estimate whether it might be beneficial to postpone 
or speed-up delivery of certain products in order to create customer benefit by either meeting 
customers’ positive or negative time preference. As shown in Chapter 3, this can have impacts 
on the perceived utility of the customer without necessarily increasing any costs for companies. 
 
As shown above, however, the differentiation between utilitarian to hedonic goods is not 
always evident as the transition can be fluent. In these cases, a distinct, objective assignment is 
not possible. Consequently, it can be difficult for companies to evaluate consumer perception 
of their products and thus their time preference.  
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The concepts of time preference and savoring seemingly contradict each other, as they link the 
postponement of consumption to opposing emotions of the consumer. Even though both 
concepts entail considerable economic potential, there has been little research in order to 
explain and, more importantly, internalize this contradiction. 
 
A rather intuitive explanation to face the contradiction is that the correct assignment of each 
model is completely individual. This approach, however, is of limited use as it does not provide 
patterns that help management to evaluate the rate of time preference for specific products. In 
this respect, the categorization into utilitarian and hedonic goods provides a highly useful 
pattern as these categories react to each one of the models. Utilitarian goods entail a high time 
preference whereas, on the other hand, hedonic goods react to the concept of savoring.  
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There are two basic strategies for management that follow this categorization. Firstly, the 
company can identify to which extent a particular product is perceived as hedonic or as 
utilitarian good and thereupon postpone or speed-up delivery. This process can lead to 
considerable increases in customer benefit. Secondly, marketing can react to prerequisites in 
the company’s distribution structure. If a certain product requires time in order to be delivered, 
marketing tools can be shaped in a way that makes the product perceivable as a hedonic good.  
 
The transition between utilitarian and hedonic goods is gradual and therefore, in some cases, 
the differentiation is not evident. Additionally, individual preferences and characteristics can 
lead to deviating perceptions of the same good.  In this respect, the preceding strategies must 
rather be interpreted as general guidelines for management than as definite rules. As there has 
been little research on the practical coherency of the preceding models, it would be important 
for businesses to overcome these empirical limitations. Furthermore, research must analyze 
how marketing tools must be shaped in order to make products consistently perceivable as 
either hedonic or utilitarian goods.  
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